The first reports of the encounter from the destroyers reached the White House at 1000 EDT. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. The accords, which were signed by other participants including the Viet Minh, mandated a temporary ceasefire line, which separated southern and northern Vietnam to be governed by the State of Vietnam an In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. 17. 14. 10. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). . Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. Conspiracy One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. 4. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. 3. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. On 28 July, the latest specially fitted destroyer, the Maddox (DD-731), set out from Taiwan for the South China Sea. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. 10. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. McNamara was ready to respond. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. 14. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. It can be deceived and it is all too often incomplete. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. Hickman, Kennedy. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. NSA officials handed the key August SIGINT reports over to the JCS investigating team that examined the incident in September 1964. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. The North Vietnamese coastal radars also tracked and reported the positions of U.S. aircraft operating east of the ships, probably the combat air patrol the Seventh Fleet had ordered in support. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. After 15 minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). This is another government conspiracy that's true. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. . When Did the U.S. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. https://www.historynet.com/case-closed-the-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. ." the Gulf of Tonkin AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. 11. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. Gulf of Tonkin Conspiracy Theory In a conversation with McNamara on Aug. 3, after the first incident, Johnson indicated he hadalready thought about the political ramifications of a military response and hadconsulted with several allies. 15. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function.
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